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Abstract: 
 
This paper focuses on the post-war process of creation of global trading system and integration 
of world trade. As the former came into being, multilateral trade liberalization became an on-
going feature of the global economy facilitating international trade, consequently importance of 
international trade in the global economy increased dramatically. Since the mid-1980s, mindset 
regarding trade policy in the developing economies, particularly middle- and high-income ones, 
began changing in a discernible manner. They liberalized their trade policy regimes and tried to 
integrate with the global economy. Several developing economies were highly successful in 
integrating with the global economy through trade. The change in mindset of policy mandarins 
was clearly visible during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Although the industrial economies were the primary beneficiaries of the multilateral trade 
liberalization, for the developing economies trade, particularly trade in manufacturing goods, 
went on increasing monotonically. The kaleidoscope of global trading system turned several 
times and international trade has enormously expanded over the preceding half century, which in 
turn contributed substantially to global integration through trade, albeit in a selective manner. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Neither the concept nor the phenomenon of financial globalization can be considered novel. 
Cross-country capital movements have a long and well-documented history. The principal focus 
of this paper is to demonstrate that during the contemporary phase of globalization policy makers 
and economic agents in the emerging market economies began to work towards a more 
financially integrated world and towards achieving a deeper degree of financial integration. The 
newest developments in the information technology and effectiveness of public policy further 
underpinned cross-border financial flows. During the contemporary period, gradually increasing 
amounts of private capital flows started going to the developing economies. Financial 
globalization has definitive and obvious efficiency implications. For instance, when capital is 
free to move globally, its scope widens and it tends to be attracted toward the opportunities of 
highest return in the global economy. To be sure, it has long-term welfare implications. 
Contagion and crisis are a vexing and pernicious downside of financial globalization. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the paper shows the lack of novelty of the 
phenomenon of financial globalization. The Section 3 deals with the reversal in financial 
globalization during the inter-War period. Section 4 focuses on the creation of the global 
financial architecture during the post-World War II era. The break down of the Bretton Woods 
system and creation of a new global financial system has been dealt with in Section 5. The 
economic and financial aspects of financial globalization have been delved into in the subsequent 
sections, that is, whether financial globalization contributes to systemic efficiency is discussed in 
Section 6. The following section analyses the globalization-growth nexus. How financial 
globalization affects the domestic financial sector is the issue for Section 8. The quantitative 
dimension of the contemporary net capital flows to the emerging market economies have been 
discussed in Section 9, while globalizing financial services have been taken up in the next 
Section. Section 11 provides a brief summery of the paper. 
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2. Novelty of Financial Globalization 
 
Like technological advancement or long-run economic growth, evolution of global financial 
integration was not “a record of ever-more-perfectly-functioning markets with ever lower 
transaction costs and ever expanding scope” (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002). Long-term growth of 
global financial markets was far from linear. Vicissitudes in the volume of financial flows were 
more common than uncommon. There were periods of slow growth in global financial 
integration, followed by those of rapid growth as well as periods of virtual standstill and 
reversals. There were periods when global financial integration was limited among a small 
number of countries, which were grouped in two or three categories and there were epochs when 
this integration expanded much more widely geographically. Liberalized markets did not enjoy 
high political popularity. Several periods witnessed strong reactions against market trends, in 
particular financial markets. In the recent past, in the middle of the twentieth century and 
towards its end, such cynicism was easy to notice. Reacting to downsides of financial 
globalization, anti-market and anti-globalization voices became particularly strident towards the 
end of the last century.  
 
Neither the concept nor the phenomenon of financial globalization can be considered novel. 
Cross-country capital movements have a long and well- documented history. As regards the 
answer to the question when and where the international banks were born, some of the earliest 
ones among them were born in Venice. The Medici family of Venice was among the first 
wealthy families to successfully venture into international banking in a big way during the 
Renaissance period.2 Italian banks developed instruments to methodically finance trade and 
governments around the Mediterranean. Although global financial flows took place during the 
Renaissance, geographically they were limited among a small number of source and recipient 
countries and were far from globalized in their movements. With expansion of trade, 
international financial systems expanded to other parts of Western and Northern Europe and 
grew more innovative. Instruments like letters of credit are known to have been working at the 
Champagne Fairs during this era.  
                                                 
2 Lorenzo de Medici took Michelangelo Buonarroti under his wings when Michelangelo was a little boy and 
provided the right artistic ambiance to him to nurture his genius. 
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From Italy, international banking expanded to the northern port cities of Bruges and Antwerp, 
and then to Amsterdam and London, essentially in that order. The last two named financial 
centers grew enormously and became the two most important hubs of international finance. 
Currencies and financial instruments developed and used in these two centers were considered 
the most credible and valuable by the market players of this period. As the industrial revolution 
spread out of Britain, the international financial markets expanded pari passu. With the 
expansion of economic activity following the industrial revolution, use and significance of the 
financial instruments created during this period increased between both kinds of market players, 
public and private.3 
 
As economic activity expanded to the so-called New World offshoots of Western Europe, 
international financial transactions supported it and international financial centers developed in 
those parts of the New World where the governments were not averse to them and followed 
supportive strategies. Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Chicago developed as financial 
centers in the United States (US), which subsequently gave way to New York. Over the years it 
dominated them and grew to be the domineering financial center of global significance. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, France and Germany succeeded in developing international 
financial centers of their own. Paris and Berlin emerged as major financial centers during this 
period, which were well integrated into the global economy. In other part of Europe and the New 
World similar financial markets began to grow, although unlike France and Germany they began 
from a low level of initial development. Financial markets in Buenos Aires and Melbourne were 
born during this period (Davis and Gallman, 2001). As an increasing number of countries 
actively adopted gold standard, after 1870, development of international finance as well as 
financial centers were accelerated. A stable exchange rate contributes to the successful 
development of international financial markets. The technological advancements of this era 
buttressed their progress.   
 
Using different measures and indicators, several analysts tried to establish that a greater degree 
of financial globalization existed in the previous epochs of globalization than in the 
                                                 
3 For the birth and expansion of international banking and finance, please refer to Das (1986), Neal (1990) and 
Cameron (1993). 
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contemporary period.4 One important distinction between financial globalization in the past and 
that in the contemporary period is that in the past a limited number of countries, and a small 
number of sectors, participated in financial globalization process. Not the same can be said about 
the contemporary period. Also, in general capital followed the migration of population and it was 
inter alia utilized in supporting trade flows. Long-term bonds of varying maturity were the most 
popular financial instruments in the past. Financial activity was highly concentrated in the hands 
of a small number of freestanding companies, which dominated the arena of global finance. 
Similarly, a small number of wealthy family groups and their banks dominated financial 
intermediation in the past.  
 
As shown by the statistical analysis in Section 3, this system was functioning smoothly, if at a 
somewhat slow pace, until the eve of the World War I. The Great Depression of the 1930s and 
the World War II added to crises and instability in the global economy. This was a period of 
economic and financial reverses. Consequently, after the World War II ended, policy makers 
switched their stance and instead of recreating the smoothly-functioning globalized financial 
markets of the pre-World War I era, they began making policy moves in the opposite direction 
by imposing capital controls to regain monetary policy autonomy. Policy makers in positions of 
responsibility were faced with, what the textbooks call, the Mundellian trilemma, or “impossible 
trinity”, or “inconsistent trinity”.5 An open capital market deprives an economy of the ability to 
target its exchange rate and to use monetary policy in pursuit of other economic objectives. 
However, the inconsistent trinity or the policy “trilemma” is only to be taken as an 
approximation. Economic policy coalesces with the socio-political forces to decide which one of 
the three policy strands will dominate policy formulation in a particular period.  
 
                                                 
4 Baldwin and Martin (1999) have reviewed the related literature in detail. Several important empirical studies have 
analyzed this issue. For instance, refer to Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) and Taylor (1998).  
5 Macroeconomic policy regime at best can accommodate only two elements of the following three policy 
objectives: (i) fixed exchange rates, (ii) autonomous monetary policy oriented toward domestic objectives, and (iii) 
free cross-border capital mobility. 
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3. Financial Globalization: The Destructive Phase 
 
Progress in globalization and a smoothly functioning equilibrium in the global financial system 
was shattered by the World War I. Attempts to return to globalization after the World War I 
failed because the economic structure of the combatants’ economies had undergone a significant 
change due to the War. This failure led to erection of trade barriers and repeated devaluations of 
currencies in a competitive manner. This kind of competition turned out to be a destructive 
phase.  
 
For appearance sake countries maintained gold standard—like gold coinage, and exchange rate 
pegs—during the World War I but created obstacles in gold and capital movement and ignored 
the rules of the game. Patriotism supplanted all the considerations of having a smoothly 
functioning global financial system. The War years of 1915-19 recorded a sudden spurt in global 
financial movements—leading to a second peak of 5 percent. This capital movement reflected 
the wartime borrowings of the European economies (Taylor, 1996). Global capital flows began 
diminishing in volume in 1920. As the War had destroyed the global financial architecture, 
governments radically altered exchange rates and prices levels and also imposed exchange 
controls. In the early 1920s European economies tried to re-peg their currencies to gold and after 
1925 a fleeting gold-exchange standard was re-established. Many European economies relaxed 
foreign exchange controls for a short while. This was the period of reconstituted gold standard, 
or gold exchange standard.  
 
Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) believe that the re-established gold exchange standard of 1925, 
with capital mobility, would have survived in the absence of the Great Depression, which in turn 
largely resulted from a disastrous error of the Federal Reserve Board in the US. Their hypothesis 
was that the gold exchange standard could be suspended during the War years and restored at the 
end of the War at the original gold parity of $20.67. This system could have lasted until the early 
1960s and then would have collapsed because of the Triffin dilemma.6 Had this hypothetical 
scenario come true, the global economy would have shifted to the floating exchange rate much 
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earlier than it did. Consequently, financial globalization would not have slowed as much as it did 
during the twentieth century.  
 
The gold exchange standard finally collapsed in 1931 when the sterling pound—one of the most 
significant currencies of this period—departed from its gold peg7. The three major currency 
crises of 1931 led to flight from the Austrian schilling, Hungarian the pengo, and the German 
mark. Increases in discount rate failed to produce the desired results. The grip of flight 
psychology was so strong that policy makers believed that exchange controls was the only option 
left to them. Intervention in the foreign exchange markets did not work and the three economies 
continued to drain their gold reserves. After 1931, when both the classical gold standard and 
gold-exchange standard had become irrelevant, foreign exchange controls returned causing 
economic turmoil. Financial instability promoted exchange controls all over the globe, in the 
core and periphery countries. Although they adopted controls it with alacrity, thinking that they 
have found the appropriate solution to the problem of financial volatility, many governments 
found it difficult to manage these controls. Some of the exchange control policies were effective 
and successful, while others were difficult to implement and unsuccessful. Uncertainty in foreign 
exchange markets continued and large movements in exchange rates became common.  
 
As the depression deepened, the Latin American economies not only depreciated their currencies 
but installed exchange controls like the other economies of this period. Many Latin American 
economies defaulted on their foreign loans, which made them a pariah. Global capital flows to 
this region virtually stopped (Alejandro, 1983). Given such uncertainties in global economic and 
financial environment, this turned out to be a lean period for global capital mobility. During the 
era of Great Depression, financial flows shrank to a meager 1.5 percent of the national income 
(Taylor, 1996). According to the investment stock approach adopted by Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2002), foreign assets were only 8 percent of global GDP in 1930, 11 percent in 1938 and merely 
5 percent in 1945.  
 
                                                 
7 In June 1931, flight from sterling pound began. The British government could not apply budgetary retrenchment 
measure to defend the currency because of the prevailing high rate of unemployment.  The Bank of England did not 
carry out an aggressive interest rate defense. Bank rate was raised shortly before the announcement of suspension of 
gold standard in September 1931. 
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The seeds of the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 were sown by the domestic and global 
economic and financial chaos of the inter-war period. After the World War II, during the decades 
of 1950s and the 1960s, global capital flows in the twelve sample countries8 fell to the lowest 
levels recorded in Taylor’s (1996) study, close to 1 percent of the national income. In 1960, the 
US share of global assets was 50 percent of total global foreign assets, the highest US ever held 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002).  
 
Although Taylor’s (1996) results and those of Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) emerged from simple 
long-term time-series analyses, they managed to tell a telling tale. They illustrated that global 
financial flows were far from smooth or uniform and that they suffered frequent dislocations and 
serious volatility. On the one hand, there were periods when the global financial flows 
strengthened, like the late nineteenth early years of the twentieth century, immediately before the 
World War I, while on the other hand there were periods like the Great Depression when they 
suffered a serious loss of momentum. More complex methodology can be adopted to study the 
global capital flow data. For instance, a study of current account identity is possible by focusing 
on the relationship between domestic savings and investment trends in the selected sample 
countries.9 
 
4. Financial Architecture After the World War II 
    
After the World War II, most currencies were not convertible. In addition, most countries had 
stringent restrictions over foreign investment. Restrictions existed from both the sides, the 
receiving countries and the source countries. As most governments were concerned about their 
exchange rate stability and autonomy in monetary policy, they had to abandon free capital 
movement as a priority policy option. In fact, there was not much of choice making involved. 
Given the restrictions and currency inconvertibility, trans-border capital movements could not 
take place. Therefore, cross-country capital movements reached and remained at their historical 
low levels in the 1950s and failed to pick up during the 1960s. The Bretton Woods era (1945-71) 
                                                 
8 Refer to footnote 8. 
9 To this end, several relevant studies are available. For instance, Eichengreen (1992b), Obstfeld (1995) and Taylor 
1998.  
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of fixed but adjustable exchange rates is known for limited capital mobility and autonomy in 
monetary policy.10  
 
Before the end of the World War II, a concerted attempt was made to reinvent a new global 
economic and financial order. Travails and disorder of the inter-War period demonstrated the 
imperious need to create such an order. Finance Ministry or Treasury officials in the allied 
countries turned their attention to devising an efficient and functional post-War economic 
order11. Some of the best-known scholars of this period picked up the gauntlet. This included 
some towering figures of the twentieth century like J.M. Keynes, who in 1941 circulated his 
proposal for the new international economic order. His paper was entitled Shaping the Post-War 
World: The Clearing Union and attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. 
 
In 1942, H.D. White publicized his vision of institutions that were intended to maintain exchange 
rate stability, macroeconomic stability and non-discriminatory trade relations among the nations. 
After long debates, White’s plan was accepted as the basis for the Bretton Woods agreement and 
the twin institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were 
established, along with subsequent establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). As these institutions had emerged subsequent to the economic and financial chaos 
between the two World Wars, one of their basic premises was that both variations in exchange 
rates and global capital movements should be closely watched, and if need be controlled. 
Although this was the majority belief, there were serious dissents. Milton Friedman and Jacob 
Viner were among the most famous dissenters who opposed the consensus view and argued in 
favor of floating exchange rates and free short-term capital movements. 
 
Countries participating in the Bretton Woods conference were attracted less by the Keynes 
concept of a new economic order because for all appearances it was found to be flirting with 
economic nationalism. His plan suffered from several excesses. It was premised on heavy 
governmental management of macroeconomic policies and exchange rate so that domestic 
stability can be attained. His proposition included extensive restrictions over foreign exchange 
                                                 
10 The complete break down of the Bretton Woods system took two years between 1971-73. 
11 Four countries had prepared official plans for presentation and discussion: Canada, France, the UK and the US. 
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transactions in general and capital movements in particular—something reminiscent of the inter-
Wars era. Exchange controls were its central feature while the notion of floating exchange rates 
was considered a pariah. Open capital markets had no place in his vision of the global economy 
of the future. Keynes also proposed an International Clearing Union (ICU) to facilitate 
multilateral trade among member countries. Trade deficit and surpluses of the members were to 
be taken care of as claims on the ICU and liabilities to the ICU, respectively. Such credits and 
debits were to be settled with the help of “bancor”, the new international currency whose value 
was to be fixed in gold.  
 
The alternative plan suggested by H.D. White accepted capital movements and viewed periodic 
exchange rate adjustments as something more acceptable than did Keynes. As opposed to 
Keynes, White’s proposal favored reduced capital and exchange rate controls. However, White’s 
plan wanted some limits placed over capital mobility because it saw US funding endless foreign 
imbalances in the balance of payments of the deficit countries. It proposed internationally agreed 
limits over capital flows for which speculators were responsible. In hindsight, White accepted 
the concept of global capital mobility but not without taking caution measures against excesses 
in capital movements (Horsefield, 1969). Thus, Keynes and White in principle wanted some kind 
of a rein on capital movement—putatively Keynes far more than White. Both agreed on 
regulation of capital flight. 
 
While there were serious disagreements in the views of the two principal proponents, there was 
partial similarity in ideas on capital account. It is reflected in the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF. Article VIII set out that the principal systemic objective of the IMF is non-discriminatory 
multilateral convertibility on current account. There were no restrains on capital movements 
related to current account payments. However, Article XIV allowed restrictions over capital 
movements during a transitional period, countervailing Article VIII. This reflected the 
cautiousness in the views of the two principal proponents. At the same time Article VI (3) states 
that, “Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital 
movements …” Article VI (1) prohibits members from using the IMF resources “to meet a large 
or sustained outflow of capital …” It even empowers the Fund to request imposition of capital 
controls in such cases. It needs to be clarified that when the IMF accepted the notion of 
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controlling capital movement, the underlying objective was to prevent currency crises and runs 
on currencies. This provided autonomy to governments to manage their monetary policy. In the 
background of the recent crises, the provisions under these Articles of Agreements have taken on 
a new meaning and relevance. 
 
Once the IMF commenced its operations, shape of things that emerged was different from what 
was visualized by the founding fathers. Most member countries found it difficult to adhere to 
Article VIII convertibility obligations. Although they were given a grace period of five years to 
prepare to commit to Article VIII, by 1957 only ten member countries had accepted its 
obligations12. Most other member countries were still following Byzantine foreign exchange 
controls. Flouting the IMF norms, some developed and developing member countries even 
turned to floating exchange rates. During the 1950s, Britain seriously considered switching to 
floating exchange rates, but after a prolonged public debate it decided against it. Britain, France, 
Italy, Germany did not accept their Article VIII obligations until 1961 while Japan followed suit 
in 1964. Germany had developed balance of payment surpluses since the early 1950s, therefore, 
it went a step ahead and moved to full convertibility on capital account. 
 
Along with recovery and reconstruction, economic and financial integration endeavors were 
underway among the European economies during the 1950s. Six large economies on the 
continent of Europe were trying to form the European Economic Commission (EEC). Article 67 
(1) of the Treaty of Rome (1957) called on its signatories to eliminate all restrictions on the 
capital movements between the member states.13 This provision was a fundamental one because 
the ultimate objective of the Treaty was full financial and monetary integration and creating a 
single European market, which could not be achieved before this condition was squarely met. In 
1959, Germany proposed and actively lobbied for complete liberalization of capital movement in 
the EEC member states as well as non-member states. To demonstrate the seriousness of its 
intent, Germany unilaterally abolished its own restrictions on capital import. In 1960, the 
economic and financial (ECOFIN) council of the EEC directed member countries to free the 
                                                 
12 The US and Canada were among the first adhere to Article XVIII. The other eight countries were Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico and Panama. 
13 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome to create the 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
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capital movements of short- and medium-term trade credits, FDI and listed shares. Although 
these policy moves prima facie were healthy for both the European and global economies, there 
was an unsuspecting downside. A new era of speculative capital flows was born which bedeviled 
policy makers inside and outside Europe. The next logical policy moves regarding capital 
account liberalization were stopped in their tracks by apprehensions of speculative attacks. Italy 
suffered a balance of payments crisis in 1964 and Britain in 1967, which slowed the integration 
process.  
 
One reason why Germany took initiative in promoting financial liberalization in the EEC was 
that the German economy had recorded relatively faster economic and productivity growth 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Together they mandated a real currency appreciation, which meant a 
pressure for raising prices in Germany measured in dollars vis-à-vis that of the US. This was 
going to be a politically unpopular move. Therefore, policy makers in Germany were not willing 
to accept this. However, once the German capital markets were liberalized, revaluation of the 
Deutsche mark was inevitable. What policy makers were reluctant to do, market forces could 
easily achieve. 
 
Notwithstanding the two crises of the mid-1960s, some European economies did take liberalizing 
measures. As France was recording surpluses in its current and capital accounts, it unilaterally 
eased its controls on capital account in 1967. Student movement of 1968 sparked capital flight 
from France, therefore, the very next year capital controls were re-imposed in France. As 
Germany was the unwitting recipient of the French flight capital, it tightened its capital inflow 
regulations and had to impose capital controls. Speculation continued in 1969 and the Franc had 
to be devalued under speculative pressure. The counter balancing speculative game went on in 
Germany, where speculators were expecting a currency revaluation for the reasons given in the 
preceding paragraph. Speculative pressure on the currency revaluation was strong and mounting. 
In response, first the Government abandoned the official exchange rate parity and then the new 
Government of Willy Brandt revalued the Deutsche mark.  In October 1969, it was revalued by 
10 percent (Bakker, 1996).  
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During the decade of 1950s and 1960s, the members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) gradually became active participants in the financial 
globalization process. The slow growth of this process bears repeating. During these two decades 
the OECD countries were not only the dominant players in the global financial markets but also 
the few economies that participated in the global financial market place. The next group to 
successfully enter the global financial markets was that of the NIEs. This sub-group could be 
taken for being a limited market participant, whose credibility in the financial market and 
creditworthiness was on the rise for good reasons.  
 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the global economy was facing the problem of dollar shortage, 
while growing US balance of payments deficits were causing alarm in their own right. The stock 
of shot-term dollar claims on the US had grown to acquire a disturbing high proportion. Some of 
these dollar claims were settled in gold while other were held despite mounting anxiety regarding 
sudden reduction in the gold content of the dollar—or an effective dollar devaluation. 
Conversions of dollar claims depleted US gold holdings, which at this point in time were the 
largest in the world. In an attempt to maintain its strength in terms of gold reserves, the US took 
several regulatory measures to limit the outflow of gold. Some of the major restrictive policy 
measures were taken after 1961, which included an escalating sequence of dividend and interest 
taxes, voluntary guidelines and mandatory limits (Bordo, 1993).  
 
Although these restrictive and regulatory measures seemed rational when they were imposed, 
there were serious doubts regarding their effectiveness and outcome. The Eurodollar market was 
being created which rendered these regulatory measures completely ineffective. When dollar 
outflows from the US were being obstructed by regulations, the London or European subsidiaries 
of the US banks could easily step in to fill the gap. In addition, the European banks competed for 
the dollar businesses. The ultimate impact of the regulations was sending dollars into the 
Eurodollar markets, leading to a spectacular growth of these markets in a short time-span. The 
Eurodollar markets grew not only fast but also at the expense of onshore US banks. As regards 
the global capital movements during the late 1960s, they had increased substantially, although 
they involved only the industrial economies.  
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In the early 1970s, market perception regarding the US dollar changed.  Financial markets were 
not impressed with the increased domestic and military spending in the US. Consequently, the 
dollar came under speculative pressure. Capital flows grew more volatile and set the stage for the 
collapse of the pegged exchange rate system. Fearing that the collapse is imminent, several 
industrial economies had floated their currencies before the Smithsonian agreement of December 
1971. When speculators attacked the second set of Smithsonian parities of 1972, all the large 
industrial economies except Britain raised their barriers to capital inflows. They placed 
quantitative restrictions on foreign borrowings as well as taxes on interest earnings. Soon the lira 
and sterling pound came under selling pressure. Italy and Britain enforced restrictions on outflow 
of capital. However, the speculative pressures persisted. The collapse of the pegged exchange 
rate system came about in early 1973. By March 1973, the industrial country currencies were 
floating against the dollar. The five EEC currencies were jointly floating in the arrangement 
called “snake”. The Italian lira was out of the “snake” and floating independently, while the 
Anglo-Irish currency union had their independent float.  
 
Financial globalization slowed down significantly during the Bretton Woods period (1945-71). It 
also took place among a small number of industrial economies. Thus viewed, this was an era of 
slow and limited globalization. The Bretton Woods arrangement did not prove to be a viable 
global economic order. It failed to reconcile domestic policy objectives, pegged exchange rates, 
and a limited degree of capital mobility justified by an open trading system. Over the 1971-73 
period, when an increasing number of industrial economies accepted “the floating exchange rate 
system as an open-ended interim regime”, policy makers in many countries felt free to liberalize 
capital movements without sacrificing their domestic policy priorities.14 
 
5. Financial Globalization After the Bretton Woods Failure 
 
As set out in the preceding paragraph, during the Bretton Woods era (1945-71) only the OECD 
economies and to an extent the NIEs participated in the slowly developing global financial 
markets. Developing economies kept stringent control over their capital account throughout the 
Bretton Woods era. The only sources of external finance for them were the official development 
                                                 
14 This section draws on Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998. For greater details, please refer to this paper.  
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assistance (ODA), which included official loans and grants and FDI. After the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, middle-income developing economies began to open up for greater 
capital mobility, while keeping an autonomous control over their monetary policy. Given the 
limiting conditions of the Mundellian trilemma (Refer to Section 1), fixed exchange rates could 
no longer be a popular policy option.  
 
According to Mundell (2000), the contemporary era of financial globalization began with the oil 
shock of 1973 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Both of these developments were 
momentous and were responsible for getting the global economy ready for financial 
globalization that followed. The large current account surpluses earned by the members of 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could not be invested in these countries 
immediately, therefore, a good part of them was recycled to developing economies through the 
so-called money center banks. The recycled petro-dollars went only to those developing 
countries that had access to capital markets. Also, a large majority of petro-dollar loans were 
either sovereign loans or were guaranteed by governments.  
 
By the early 1980s, several developing economies had accumulated large debts. Many of them, 
particularly those in Latin America, had over borrower due to low interest rates in the 1970s. 
However, the 1980s began with a global downturn. Owing to weakened export revenues and 
historically rising interest rates, many Latin American developing countries failed to service their 
debt. A situation of generalized default emerged. Money center banks, which had over lent, were 
unable and unwilling to rollover debts that were maturing. The debt crisis of 1982 started with 
Mexico declaring a moratorium in July on its external liability. Flagrant defaults were avoided 
by concerted efforts orchestrated by the IMF. Brady Bonds were invented towards the late 1980s 
to resolve the debt crisis of the developing countries (Das, 1989). This development 
subsequently helped in the development of bond markets for the emerging market economies.  
 
Investors in the industrial countries found that deregulation, privatization, merger and 
acquisitions (M&As) and advances in the information and communications technology (ICT) 
coalesced to make FDI and equity investment in the emerging market economies more attractive 
than before. It was also made easy due to growth in global financial and banking markets. The 
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result was an FDI and equity investment spike in the emerging market economies in the 1990s. 
The prime movers of the contemporary wave of globalization are governments, private investing 
and borrowing firms, financial institutions and to a limited extent households. However, the 
Asian crisis of 1997 adversely affected the capital flows to the emerging market economies, 
although the FDI flows remained unaffected. 
 
During the contemporary period, gradually increasing amounts of private capital flows started 
going to the developing economies. Private capital did not go to all the developing economies. 
Only a sub-group of economies, namely, emerging markets, has succeeded in attracting capital 
and participating in the financial globalization process. As noted below, this condition is the sine 
qua non of the emerging market economies. They are somewhat imprecisely defined as the NIEs 
and middle-income developing countries in which governments and corporations have access to 
private international capital markets, or can attract institutional portfolio investment, or both. 
Different institutions include slightly different sets of countries in this category. For example, the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) includes 29 countries from Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. The IMF includes all the NIEs and the middle-income developing 
countries in its definition of the emerging market economies. The Economist classifies 25 
middle-income developing and transitional economies as the emerging market economies. 
 
Domestic financial deregulation stimulated the financial globalization process. The most 
significant deregulation was that of capital account. Full capital account liberalization movement 
began in Europe during the 1980s. As noted in the Section 5, the Treaty of Rome aimed at 
achieving full financial and monetary integration. Encouraged by Germany, whose capital 
account was completely open in 1981, the members of the European Union (EU) began moving 
towards free intra-European capital mobility. France joined in these endeavors in 1983. The 
industrialized EU economies believed that a liberalized capital account would inter alia impose 
discipline over monetary and fiscal policies. The Netherlands opened its capital account 
completely in 1986, Denmark in 1989, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy in 1990, Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland in 1992, Greece in 1994. Although Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 
1995, their capital account was open for sometime when they joined (Bakker, 1996). 
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Having witnessed the recent benefits of financial globalization, policy makers and economic 
agents in the emerging market economies are likely to work towards a more financially 
integrated world and towards achieving a deeper degree of financial integration. The newest 
developments in the ICT and effectiveness of public policy would further underpin cross-border 
financial flows.  
 
However, in spite of the progress in financial globalization, the global financial system is far 
from being perfectly integrated. Several counter-globalization forces are still at work. Analysts 
have provided evidence of inadequate progress in financial integration, imperfections in the 
global capital markets, persistent capital market segmentation, home country bias, and 
correlation between domestic savings and investment.15 Yet, a reversal of the recent trend is 
difficult to visualize, albeit it is not an impossibility. It is largely because of liberalization and 
deregulation of economies that have taken place, as well as technological advances in the 
financial services sector. Besides, the channels of financial globalization are so many and so 
diverse that a reversal of financial globalization would be difficult. This observation applies to 
both partially integrated and fully integrated economies. This is not to deny that during the slack 
periods of global growth, the progress towards globalization would not suffer.  
 
6. Financial Globalization and Efficiency 
 
One of the definitions of financial globalization is integration of domestic financial system of a 
country with the global financial markets and institutions. The enabling framework of financial 
globalization essentially includes liberalization and deregulation of the domestic financial sector 
as well as liberalization of the capital account, without which financial globalization cannot take 
place. As the trans-border capital flows begin, they integrate domestic and global financial 
markets. In a globalized financial environment domestic lenders and borrowers participate in the 
global markets, and utilize global financial intermediaries for borrowing and lending.  
 
                                                 
15 For evidence to this effect, refer to Frankel (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Tesar and Werner (1998) and 
Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (1999).  
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Financial globalization has definitive and obvious efficiency implications. For instance, when 
capital is free to move globally, its scope widens and it tends to be attracted toward the 
opportunities of highest return in the global economy. To be sure, it has long-term welfare 
implications. Second, increased integration and globalization of financial markets is essentially 
based on major technological and structural developments. They have lowered the costs of 
transactions, information and mobility. Third, in a world of globalized finances, the recipient 
economies can smooth their domestic consumption and investment curves with the help of the 
global capital inflows. Fourth, it is well known that financial assets have variable and imperfectly 
correlated pay-offs. Under these circumstances financial globalization provides and enhances 
opportunities for investors to diversify risk by allowing them to deploy capital in a wider array of 
global assets. Such risk diversification also improves returns on assets, enhancing systemic 
efficiency.  
 
Financial globalization exposes private agents and economies to international competition. The 
competitive process is regarded as one that enhances efficiency both in the goods markets and 
those for the factors of production. One manifestation of the enhanced international competition 
is the movement of capital to economies that promise highest risk-adjusted rate of return. In this 
kind of mise-en-scene there is a cost of maintaining inefficient and regulated market structures. 
As this kind of international competition rises, the cost to countries that maintain illiberal, 
regulation-ridden and inefficient financial market structures also rises.  
 
However, there is a serious down side to global investment diversification. One lesson of the 
history, recent (1930s and 1980s) and remote, is that capital-importing countries often enact 
capital controls laws and/or prevent repatriation of yields and profits. A benign view of capital 
controls followed the Great Depression and it was considered acceptable, but only under certain 
conditions for certain periods.16 As these possibilities are real, they tend to make investors 
cautious, on occasions overly so. Eventually the apprehension of capital controls work as 
disincentives to financial globalization. Such apprehensions encourage misallocation of capital 
by keeping excessive amount of it in capital-abundant countries, while little capital flowing into 
                                                 
16 When Malaysia imposed capital controls following 1987-88 financial crisis, scholars like Paul Krugman 
supported the move and provided several justifications. 
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capital-scarce emerging market and developing economies. They also bias domestic savings 
towards domestic investment activity (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980).  
 
Immobility of capital, whatever the frictional factors, can adversely affect the cross-country 
pattern of economic growth (See Section 8 below). For one, it will retard the convergence 
process among countries because capital would be  confined to the capital-abundant economies. 
Such misallocation of capital will also have distributional implications. Inefficient allocation of 
capital would lead to low returns in the capital-abundant economies, while capital-scarce 
economies would perpetuate inefficiency of their own, which would be characterized by low 
wages. Such misallocation of productive resources would indeed have baneful long-term welfare 
implications.17  
 
Another potential advantage of open capital markets, which are mandatory under financial 
globalization, is that policy makers realize that there is an imperious need to have a high degree 
of market discipline. Following a logical and pragmatic set of macroeconomic policies and 
toeing the line in areas like international financial regulatory and supervision norms becomes 
imperative policy targets. International accounting standards are known to follow financial 
globalization, which in turn lead to greater systemic transparency. This has both macroeconomic 
and institutional implications (Stiglitz, 2000). Unsound policies and poor financial regulatory 
environment are known to trigger quick capital outflows. This kind of cautiousness supplements 
the disciplining power, which is considered inherent in a commitment to an exchange rate peg. 
These advantages of financial globalization motivated its growth and expansion in various 
periods.    
 
7. Financial Globalization and Growth Nexus 
 
If financial globalization, as we saw in the preceding section, allocated global capital more 
efficiently, financial immobility naturally would yield the opposite results.  It would have 
negative welfare implications. Economies that succeed in developing well-functioning domestic 
financial systems are able to do so by developing an adequate institutional base. One builds on 
                                                 
17 Williamson (1996) provides a detailed and formal treatment of this issue. 
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the other in a symbiotic manner. Macroeconomic theory has developed enough during the last 
decade and has analytically established that banks and other financial institutions endogenously 
improve the allocation of available credit. Total factor productivity (TFP) in the economy 
improves through the selection and funding of projects with high private and social returns (King 
and Levine, 1993). Furthermore, as soon as a sound financial and institutional base is created in 
an economy, global investors feel confident in investing in it. They promote a higher domestic 
rate of investment and therefore growth, eventually leading to financial globalization of the 
recipient economy. Two relationships are apparent here: first, the finance-growth nexus, and 
second, finance-growth-financial globalization nexus.18  
 
Economic history provides evidence of support to the above hypothesis. Countries that 
developed a sound financial system, an adequate institutional base to underpin it and were 
financially innovative early in their growth process, also succeeded in growing rapidly. They 
attracted foreign capital easily which served to bolster their growth endeavors. Three of the most 
conspicuous historical examples of such success are the Netherlands, Britain and the US, in that 
historical order. Their economic history demonstrated that they first emerged as economic 
leaders in their own right, followed by becoming leaders in the export of capital. The 
Netherlands first, and Britain thereafter, led in developing a sound financial system and 
institutional base in the seventeenth century. The Netherlands was the political and economic 
power of the seventeenth century, while Britain of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. At 
the end of the eighteenth century, after the declaration of independence, the US developed its 
financial infrastructure on the same paradigm as did the two precursors. Section 6 of this paper 
has discussed the US financial reforms of 1790.  
 
Following these three leaders in their tracks, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
France and Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia, also became financial innovators. Like the 
three leaders, these three economies also grew first into rapidly growing economies and 
subsequently into substantial capital exporters. Financial development and trade expansion not 
only underpin the growth endeavors but also help in the convergence of interest rates among the 
                                                 
18 Refer to Rousseau and Sylla (2001) and Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) for a detailed discussion.  
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globalizing economies. Rousseau and Sylla (2001) took a sample of seventeen countries and 
long-term data series beginning 1850 and used well-known cross-country regression framework 
of Barro (1991) to study the finance-growth nexus. Their results supported the view that 
countries with well-developed and innovative financial systems engage in more trade and appear 
to be better integrated with the other economies. The seventeen sample countries demonstrated 
an evidence of convergence of long-term interest rates. Economic growth and increasing 
globalization in the Atlantic economies (named above) and Japan may indeed have been finance-
led.  
 
8. Financial Globalization and the Domestic Financial Sector 
 
Contagion and crisis are a vexing and pernicious downside of financial globalization. That being 
said, global integration can indeed have a strong influence on the development of the domestic 
financial sector in the developing economies. Two of the most important potential economic 
benefits of financial globalization are development and growth of the financial sector and greater 
availability of funds for productive investment. Globalization is responsible for improvement in 
the quality of financial infrastructure in the domestic economy, which in turn reduces the 
omnipresent problem of asymmetric information. Lenders in a developing economy confront the 
problem of asymmetric information much more than in an industrial economy. This is the prime 
cause of adverse selection and moral hazard in the developing economies19. By bringing about 
improvement in the asymmetric information scenario, financial globalization directly cures the 
twin malaise of adverse selection and moral hazard. This improves not only the quality of credit 
in the domestic financial markets but also its availability.  
 
Globalizing financial markets benefit both, savers (investors) and borrowers. In a financially 
integrated world capital movements easily and rapidly take place from where capital is to where 
it is needed. As alluded to earlier, investors looking for better returns on their investments seek to 
invest in assets in the emerging market and other developing economies where marginal return of 
capital is higher. That financial integration causes economy-wide benefits has been clarified in 
                                                 
19 Adverse selection implies resources going to low-quality projects, and moral hazard means borrower taking risky 
positions after borrowing funds and use financial resources in a manner not beneficial to the lender. Adverse 
selection and moral hazard are the perennial problems of a poorly developed financial market.  
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Section 2. This kind of capital flows is reflected in the large current account deficits commonly 
seen in developing economies. With greater flows of capital, more capital becomes available to 
the economies that are well integrated with the global economy.  
 
As more capital inflows take place with progress in financial integration, the depth and 
sophistication of domestic financial markets increase. Also, financial products, instruments and 
services expand, providing more financial opportunities to both borrowers and lenders. A larger 
number of instruments provide risk diversification opportunities to global lenders. Borrowers can 
also benefit by lowering their cost of capital. As global investors are more diversified by nature, 
they can consider paying higher prices for domestic bonds and equities. It was observed that with 
expansion of capital inflows, emerging market economies were able to develop their stock and 
bond markets. Their financial services industry also expanded and strengthened.  
 
An amber signal is warranted here. Although more equity and bonds are issued now in the 
emerging market economies, it cannot be taken to mean that all financial institutions have 
improved their operations and there is an all round improvement in the domestic financial 
markets. Due to competition with much larger international institutions, the opposite can also 
occur, that is, domestic financial markets can shrink or lose their importance for the domestic 
borrowers and lenders. Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2001) have provided evidence of 
shrinking domestic stock markets in several emerging market and developing economies as 
trading moved on to global bourses.  
 
The malaise of asymmetric information can be effectively controlled and minimized by bringing 
about improvements in the financial infrastructure. As it improves with financial globalization, it 
creates a transparent, competitive and efficient domestic financial system and environment for 
the economic agents to operate. In such an environment asymmetric information cannot grow. 
As financial globalization ushers in greater competition in the domestic financial market, it can 
generate efficiency gains. As set out in Section 2, it has been observed that financial 
globalization imposes stringent market discipline. By demonstration effect, international banks 
and other international institutions refine different areas of the domestic financial sector (for 
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instance, accounting practices and supervision norms) and impel it towards the international 
frontier.  
 
Eager to reduce their risk exposure by diversifying their portfolios and to improve their profit 
performance, foreign banks and financial institutions enter the emerging market and developing 
economies and generally have a direct impact over financial sector development in the host 
economy. Foreign banks also promote adoption of best practices in the domestic financial sector. 
They provide know-how for better risk management practices as well as corporate governance 
techniques. Corporate governance improves in the domestic financial sector because new global 
shareholders tend to monitor the management more closely. Foreign corporations bring with 
them state-of-the-art management techniques. When the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
took a small stake in the Bank of Shanghai in the late 1990s, part foreign ownership led to 
significant changes in governance (Lardy, 2001).  
 
9. Dimension of Net Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies 
 
Cross-country financial flows to the emerging market economies were low, at paltry $28 billion, 
during the mid-1970s. Net flows reached $306 billion in 1997 in real terms, at the eve of the 
Asian financial crisis (Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001; Das, 2003). This was their peak 
level. They suffered a sharp decline after that because of the Asian and other financial and 
economic crises. The composition of external capital underwent a dramatic transformation 
during this period. Official flows or official development assistance (ODA) either stagnated or 
declined. As a result their relative significance in global capital flows declined. In their place, 
private capital flows became the major source of external finance for a good number of emerging 
market economies. FDI became an important and dependable source of finance for the emerging 
markets and other middle-income economies during the decade of the 1980s and 1990s. Its 
growth was particularly strong during the decade of 1990s. A large part of FDI to emerging 
market economies was in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Many large developing 
economies were privatizing their public sector enterprise during this period. Those that were 
rated as creditworthy by the financial markets succeeded in attracting FDI in the process (Lipsey, 
1999).  
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While syndicated bank loans were a popular instrument during the 1970s, they gradually went 
out of use after the Latin American debt crisis of 1982. In the 1970s, developing countries hardly 
attracted portfolio investment in stocks and bond markets. They were as low as $100 million in 
1970. Like the FDI, they began to increase in the 1980s. Between 1983 and 1989 net portfolio 
investment to the developing economies averaged $6.5 billion per annum. This average increased 
to $43.6 billion per annum over the 1990-94 period (IMF, 1995). Portfolio investment peaked at 
$103 billion in 1996 in real terms (Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001; Das, 2003). Global 
institutional investors found this channel of investment functional and profitable. Mutual funds, 
insurance companies, and pension funds channeled large amounts through portfolio investment 
into the emerging market economies.  In addition, a wide-ranging financial restructuring had 
taken place in the recipient economies making large portfolio investment possible. The Asian 
crisis of 1997 had a strong adverse influence over private capital flows to developing economies 
and they sharply declined after that.  
 
The emerging market economies have been defined above as those where governments and 
corporations have access to private international capital markets, or can attract institutional 
portfolio investment, or both. Not all the emerging market economies have an equal access to the 
international capital markets. The access is directly related to their perceived creditworthiness in 
the global financial marketplace. Therefore, distribution of global capital among the recipient 
economies is highly uneven. Some economies like China, East Asian and Latin American ones 
have easy access and receive large amounts of global capital resources, while others like South 
Asian ones (India being an exception in this group) have limited access. Many like the African 
economies have not been able to attract any global capital.  
 
Using Global Development Finance database, Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton (2001) have shown 
that low-income developing economies receive very little amount of net global capital, while 
some does go to the middle-income developing economies. In accordance with the 
creditworthiness concept, lion’s share of global capital flows are attracted by top twelve recipient 
countries20. All of these fall in the category of emerging market economies, which are relatively 
                                                 
20 They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia, Mexico, Russian 
Federation, Thailand, and Turkey.  
 27
more globalized than the others. During the 1990s global capital flows to these twelve emerging 
market economies accelerated at a steep rate, which affected the composition of the total global 
financial resources going to developing economies. The proportion of financial flows dedicated 
to the low- and middle-income developing economies decreased at the end of the 1990s. For all 
appearance, many economies in this group of rapidly financially globalizing economies are 
diverging from the rest of the developing economies.  
 
10. Globalizing Financial Services 
 
Over the decade of 1990s, presence of international financial intermediaries has expanded 
considerably.21 This applies more to international commercial banks than to investment banks, 
insurance companies and mutual funds. It is incorrect to say that the global expansion of 
financial intermediaries has been uniform because this has occurred fairly unevenly. Conversely, 
globalization of financial services also occurs when domestic savers (or lenders) and borrowers 
are able to make use of financial intermediaries located globally. For instance, financial services 
are said to be globalized when domestic stocks are traded on large international bourses abroad. 
During the 1990s, presence of foreign banks increased in three regions namely East Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. 
 
 Foreign bank ownership of assets increased rapidly during the 1990s. Total assets held by them 
increase maximum in the emerging market economies in Latin America, particularly in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. In the emerging market economies in Eastern 
European (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) share of total assets controlled by foreign 
banks crossed 50 percent of the total. As compared to these two regions, the activities of the 
foreign banks expanded less rapidly in the emerging markets of East Asia, like Korea (Republic 
of), Malaysia, and Thailand. (Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001) 
 
International bond issuance activity by emerging market economies recorded a sharp spurt in 
1993, crossing $50 billion for the first time. It stabilized around this level until 1996 when it 
                                                 
21 This section is based and draws on Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001 and Das 2003. The statistical 
data used here comes from the same sources.  
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nearly doubled. Both 1993 and 1996 were the years of high global capital flows. In 1997, 
issuance activity by emerging market economies peaked at $120 billion. Due to Asian financial 
crisis and its contagion effects, international bond issuance dropped to around $75 billion over 
the next three years. (Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001) 
 
The ADRs and GDRs are negotiable certificates representing ownership of shares in a 
corporation in another country. They are held by a depository, which in turn issues a certificate 
that can be traded in another country, for example, the United States. Emerging market 
economies began using ADRs and GDRs for raising capital from the global capital markets in 
1990 in a small way. The middle-income developing countries began using them in 1992. Firms 
from both emerging market and middle-income developing economies increased their 
participation in the US equity markets using ADRs and GDRs. The top six emerging market 
economies that had the highest participation over the decade of the 1990s were: Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Korea (Republic of) and Mexico. They accounted for most of the activity by 
developing countries in the US equity markets. In terms of capital flows, this group may be 
creating a divergence among the developing countries. This group benefits more from the global 
capital markets by way of lower cost of capital and longer maturity structure of its debt. 
(Schmukler and Zoido-Lobaton, 2001) 
 
11. Conclusions and Summing-Up 
 
The evolution of global financial integration was not a record of ever-more-perfectly-functioning 
markets with ever-lower transaction costs and ever expanding scope. Long-term growth of global 
financial markets was far from linear. Vicissitudes in the volume of financial flows were more 
common than uncommon. Neither the concept nor the phenomenon of financial globalization can 
be considered novel. Cross-country capital movements have a long and well- documented 
history. Some of the earliest international banks among them were born in Venice. The Medici 
family of Venice was among the first wealthy families to successfully venture into international 
banking in a big way during the Renaissance period. From Italy, international banking expanded 
to the northern port cities of Bruges and Antwerp, and then to Amsterdam and London, 
essentially in that order. As economic activity expanded to the so-called New World offshoots of 
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Western Europe, international financial transactions supported it and international financial 
centers developed in those parts of the New World. Using different measures and indicators, 
several analysts tried to establish that a greater degree of financial globalization existed in the 
previous epochs of globalization than in the contemporary period. 
 
After the World War II, as most governments were concerned about their exchange rate and 
autonomy in monetary policy, they had to abandon free capital movement as a priority policy 
option. Cross-country capital movements reached their historical low level in the 1950s and 
failed to pick up during the 1960s. Before the end of the World War II, a concerted attempt was 
made to reinvent a new global economic and financial order. While there were serious 
disagreements in the views of the two principal proponents, namely J.M. Keynes and H.D. 
White, there was partial similarity in ideas on capital account. It is reflected in the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF. Along with recovery and reconstruction, economic and financial 
integration endeavors were underway among the European economies during the 1950s. Six 
large economies on the continent of Europe were trying to form the European Economic 
Commission (EEC). Article 67 (1) of the Treaty of Rome (1957) called on its signatories to 
eliminate all restrictions on the capital movements between the member states. Germany took a 
good deal of initiative in promoting financial liberalization in the EEC was that the German 
economy had recorded relatively faster economic and productivity growth during the 1950s and 
1960s. During the decade of 1950s and 1960s, the members of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) gradually became active participants in the financial 
globalization process. The Bretton Woods period (1945-71) is known for slow and limited 
financial globalization. The Bretton Woods arrangement did not prove to be a viable global 
economic order. It failed to reconcile domestic policy objectives, pegged exchange rates, and a 
limited degree of capital mobility justified by an open trading system. 
 
Developing economies kept stringent control over their capital account throughout the Bretton 
Woods era. The only sources of external finance for them were the official development 
assistance (ODA), which included official loans and grants and FDI. After the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, middle-income developing economies began to open up for greater 
capital mobility, while keeping an autonomous control over their monetary policy. Given the 
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limiting conditions of the Mundellian trilemma, fixed exchange rates could no longer be a 
popular policy option for them. Awareness of benefits from financial globalization grew among 
the developing economies. Having witnessed the recent benefits of financial globalization, policy 
makers and economic agents in the emerging market economies began to work towards a more 
financially integrated world and towards achieving a deeper degree of financial integration. The 
newest developments in the ICT and effectiveness of public policy would further underpin cross-
border financial flows. During the contemporary period, gradually increasing amounts of private 
capital flows started going to the developing economies. 
 
Financial globalization has definitive and obvious efficiency implications. For instance, when 
capital is free to move globally, its scope widens and it tends to be attracted toward the 
opportunities of highest return in the global economy. To be sure, it has long-term welfare 
implications. Contagion and crisis are a vexing and pernicious downside of financial 
globalization.  
 
Cross-country financial flows to the emerging market economies were low, at paltry $28 billion, 
during the mid-1970s. Net flows reached $306 billion in 1997 in real terms, at the eve of the 
Asian financial crisis. This was their peak level. They suffered a sharp decline after that because 
of the Asian and other financial and economic crises. Over the decade of 1990s, presence of 
international financial intermediaries has expanded considerably. This applies more to 
international commercial banks than to investment banks, insurance companies and mutual 
funds. It is incorrect to say that the global expansion of financial intermediaries has been uniform 
because this has occurred fairly unevenly. 
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